A Theoretical Results
This section provides proofs for the results in Section 2. Equations (3) and (4) can be obtained by integrating over landholdings R iv in inequality (2) with (i) τ vj > 0 and R L ≥ R or (ii) R L < R (⇐= τ vj = 0). First, consider the following expressions for the thresholds within which migration is both feasible and profitable in period t (from the perspective of t − 1 decision-makers required to pay fixed upfront costs in that period) where E t−1 [p vt σ vt ] = α v p v,t−1 σ v , which hinges on cov t−1 (p vt , σ vt ) = 0, i.e. households cannot forecast the relationship between rainfall and prices next period. This does not imply that past rainfall has no effect on contemporaneous prices. Rather, a v,t−k for k > 0 are elements of the error term q s=0 υ s e v,t−s in the ARM A(1, Q) expression for rice prices. Thus, past output has a direct effect on current prices. 1 If CIA constraints are binding, then the stock migration rate in period t is derived by integrating over all landholdings R iv ∈ [R L,t−1 , R U,t−1 ] in village v (maintaining the innocuous normalization R = 1 ha)
Replacing the expressions for R L and R U with those in equation (A.1) and taking the difference in logs between t + 1 and t, we obtain equation (3).
On the other hand, if CIA constraints are not binding and R L < R (⇐= τ vj = 0), then Similarly substituting for R U,t−1 and taking differences in logs implies equation (4) . Recall that, by definition, the expressions for the intensive margin in (A.2) and (A.3) must be greater than zero.
Proposition 1
The proofs in the presence of CIA constraints follow immediately from differentiation of equation (3 The derivative with respect to rainfall last period, a v,t−1 , is identical to ∂∆ M v,t+1 /∂a vt with a leading negative sign and shifting all t subscripts back to t − 1. The proof that rainfall shocks have no effect in the absence of CIA constraints is trivial since a vt and a v,t−1 do not enter equation (4). The positive effect of price shocks on M v,t+1 in the presence of CIA constraints follows immediately from the fact that λ v /β > 0. The proof that price shocks have a negative effect on the change in migration rates in the absence of CIA constraints proceeds by checking that the 1 The expressions are more complicated if prices (i) follow a higher-order autoregressive process or (ii) have a forecastable nonzero drift term, and/or (iii) households do not have rational expectations over the high frequency seasonality in prices. Nevertheless, the assumptions here are largely consistent with the time series properties of rainfall and rice prices in Indonesia (and presumably elsewhere) . Moreover, the first-order price formulation is sufficiently general to comprise more higher-order Markov processes (see Chambers and Bailey, 1996) .
following expression satisfies increasing differences (over time) − C vj,t+1 ). This condition holds so long as migration costs are non-increasing, C vj,t+1 ≤ C vjt , which seems plausible in most settings. Of course, taking the derivative with respect to the price level, we find 
Proposition 2
The fact that λ v has an ambiguous effect on the intensive margin follows immediately from differentiating equations (3) or (4) Multiple Labor Units. There are two ways to think about the household income maximization problem above in the context of allocating multiple units of household labor. In either approach, there is no tradeoff between holding on to one's land and migrating as in Jayachandran (2006) . Moreover, the key insight in inequality (2) remains unchanged. In case one, define S iv ≡ s iv L iv where s is the share of household i's total labor L working at home. The collective household objective is then
subject to Y ivt ≥ τ vj C vj,t+1 , with the solution s * iv implying that household i finds migration profitable if (1). In case two, we appeal to the fact that Y ivt = L y ivt , where y ivt is output per capita. Hence, household i has at least one migrant abroad in t + 1 whenever E t [p v,t+1 σ v,t+1 ]y iv,t+1 ≤ (W vj,t+1 − C vj,t+1 ). Because labor is perfectly substitutable within the household and the technology is constant returns, this condition also holds under equation (1).
Extensive Margin. As discussed in Section 5, λ v has an ambiguous effect on the extensive margin regardless of the formulation of the extreme landholding statistics. Under the finite sample formulation, the proof follows immediately from the derivative of the first equation in the footnote on page 15 with respect to λ v ,
ln R L , the sign of which cannot be determined without imposing ad hoc bounds on parameter values. The ambiguity similarly holds for the population-based order statistic approach. Meanwhile, the positive effect of population size N v on the extensive margin follows from straightforward differentiation.
B Econometric Procedures
This section details the two-step estimating framework introduced in equations (8) in Section 5.
B.1 Parametric
The parametric approach due to Poirier (1980) presumes that (u vt , u v,t+1 , ∆ε v,t+1 ) in equation (8) follow a trivariate normal distribution with mean zero, variances (1, 1, var(∆ε)), and pairwise correlation terms (ρ utut+1 , ρ ut∆ε , ρ ut+1∆ε ). These assumptions imply that E ∆ε v,t+1 Z v,t−1 φ t−1 > −u vt , Z vt φ t > −u v,t+1 = ρ ut∆ε κ vt + ρ ut+1∆ε κ v,t+1 , where κ vt and κ v,+1 are bivariate Mills ratio terms. Implementation proceeds in two steps. First, I estimate a bivariate probit model for the extensive margins in t and t + 1. Since prices, rainfall and population size vary over time, the bivariate first stage has several sequential exclusion restrictions. Second, I augment an empirical specification for the change in the log migration rate with the estimated correction terms κ vt and κ v,t+1 , which enter with population coefficients equal to ρ ut∆ε and ρ ut+1∆ε respectively. Straightforward OLS then delivers a consistent estimate of second stage parameters. See Rochina-Barrachina (1999) for further theroetical background on the relationship between Poirier's original cross-sectional bivariate probit and the two-period panel implementation as described here.
B.2 Semiparametric
This section sketches a practical semiparametric procedure based on Das et al. (2003) for estimating the system of equations in (8) that is arguably more robust to distributional misspecification than the parametric Poirier approach.
Rather than closed-form correction terms, the semiparametric approach relies on a double-index in the propensity scores g(Z v,t−1 φ t−1 , Z vt φ t ), where g is an unknown function of the latent variable indices.
Implementation proceeds as follows. First, rather than assuming bivariate normality of (u vt , u v,t+1 ), I use a seemingly unrelated linear probability models (SU-LPM) making no assumptions on the joint distribution of u vt and u v,t+1 (Zellner and Lee, 1965) .
1 Second, I use the estimates of φ t and φ t+1 to approximate g(·). In practice, I employ an Lth-degree power series expansion in the propensity scores P s = Z s φ s -linear predictions recovered from the bivariate SU-LPM estimatorfor village v to have at least one migrant in period s. 2 Lastly, consistent second-stage estimates of Θ can be obtained from an OLS regression conditioning on the power series g(·) function so long as at least two variables in Z t−1 ∪ Z t do not also appear in X t .
B.3 Inference
In both the parametric and semiparametric framework outlined above, the correction terms introduce added sampling variation into the second-stage. 3 Taking a conservative and unbiased approach to inference, I implement a bootstrap−t procedure (also known as percentile−t) with clustering at the district level. All tables report the uncorrected standard errors, but the significance levels are computed based on the cluster bootstrap−t procedure described in detail in Cameron et al. (2008 The simulation results in Cameron et al. (2008) suggest that the empirical setup in this paper is well suited to the cluster bootstrap−t procedure. In particular, the data comprise a large number of districts (> 200 in all specifications) with an unbalanced number of villages, several observable variables are relatively constant within district, and several binary regressors. Moreover, Yamagata (2006) finds that the bootstrap−t procedure outperforms the conventional bootstrap−se procedure in the context of estimating Heckman (1976) -type selection models similar to those in this paper.
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should not affect the standard errors on the first-and second-step coefficients in the model in equation (8) because (i) the moment conditions in the two village-level equations in (8) are orthogonal to the moment condition in the auxiliary OLS household-level regressions used to estimate λv for each village, and (ii) the λv terms enter linearly, and hence the added sampling variation can be ignored (see Newey and McFadden, 1994 , pp. 2182 -2183 . 4 In applications of the bootstrap−t procedure, authors sometimes report p-values. While retaining the original biased standard errors, I report the unbiased significance levels when those p-values fall below 0.1. The underlying p-values are available upon request. 5 The cluster bootstrap−t procedure that I employ yields confidence intervals with correct coverage in addition to asymptotic refinement. In unreported results similar to Yamagata (2006) , I also find that the 95% confidence intervals generated by a conventional cluster bootstrap−se procedure fail to cover the original point estimate in more than 5% of iterations, suggesting important finite-sample shortcomings of the conventional bootstrap. 
C Data Description

D Theory and Estimation with the Pareto Distribution
In this section, I provide additional background on the assumed Pareto distribution for land-holdings as well as details on the empirical content of the estimated Pareto shape parameters λ v . Figure D .1 shows the familiar power law linearity in plots of the log complementary CDF against log wetland holding size for 16 randomly chosen districts. A more systematic analysis of Paretian properties at the village level requires estimating distributional parameters using the universal microdata from the the Agricultural Census.
I obtain estimates of λ v for every village in Indonesia using the Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) estimator. That is, for each village I regress the log rank minus 1/2 on the log of the given land-holding size. Given that some households within each village report the same land-holding size, ties are broken by taking the average rank.
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Identical results obtain when using the log minimum, log maximum rank, or the log complementary CDF as the dependent variable (the measures have mutual correlations above 0.95). In terms of differences in λ v across the three different measures of land-holdings, Figure D .2 demonstrates that total agricultural land-holdings tend to yield the lowest estimates of λ v (greater dispersion) whereas wetland holdings tend to yield the largest estimates of λ v (less dispersion). 2 This is consistent with the existence of relatively smallholder rice agriculture and much larger plots used to grow other crops besides rice throughout the country.
Applying a test for departures from Paretian linearity suggested by Gabaix (2009) , I find that the Pareto assumptions do not hold in around 25 percent of villages. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed in the paper, I maintain the view that the Pareto provides a reasonable approximation to the land-holdings distribution for the specific analytic purposes in this study. The goal is not to establish that land-holdings undeniably follow a power law, but rather that the formulation here provides a good fit to the data. And in Appendix F.5, I demonstrate that the key parameter estimates in the two-step model for flow migration rates are unaffected by imposing alternative choices of R in the estimation of λ v .
The variation in λ v across villages contains information on the distribution of wealth and agricultural activities. several months prior to the initial discussion and eventual implementation of the import ban. Thus, the observed heterogeneity in land-holdings could not be due to land transactions in expectation of or response to the price shock. Moreover, Benjamin (1995) demonstrates that farm sizes in Javanese villages are relatively fixed in the shortrun due to imperfect land markets and long rental contracts. More recent Susenas data from 2005 covering the entire country confirm that less than one percent households engage in land transactions over a one year horizon. The same transaction rate holds in the data from one year prior, suggesting that households had not purchased land in expectation of rising prices. 1 The discrete clumping at certain round land-holding sizes apparent in Figure D .1 in the paper is due in part to imperfect knowledge about plot sizes or boundaries. I therefore view the continuity of the Pareto distribution as a reasonable and innocuous approximation to the discrete land-holdings distribution-an assumption common in empirical work using the Pareto distribution (see Gabaix, 2009 ). 2 In each case, there are a number of villages with λv < 1, which implies infinite mean land-holdings under the strict Pareto assumptions. When estimating λv using total agricultural land-holdings, for example, nearly 7 percent of villages have estimates of λv < 1. In all but 428 of these villages, however, the 95% upper confidence interval exceeds unity according to the unbiased standard error formula λv 2/Nv given in Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) . 
Notes:
The curves are kernel densities of λv broken down by village depending depending on whether the village head reports in Podes 2005 that a majority of (agricultural) households in the village sell, subsist, or both conditional on that village reporting agriculture being the most prominent source of employment. The densities employ an Epanechnikov kernel, a rule-of-thumb bandwidth, and trimming of the top and bottom 1 percent of λv.
In this section, I provide further background on the rice price shock subsequent to the ban on imports in 2004, the time series properties of rainfall and rice prices, and the effect of these shocks on expenditures and wages.
E.1 Spatial Variation in the Rice Price Shock: Theory and a Simple Test
To understand how the import ban exerted differential pressure on local prices across regions, I first consider a simple model which micro-founds local rice prices based on the domestic market structure, imports, and the world price. The primary contribution of the model is to rationalize the lack of spatial arbitrage evident in Figure 2 in the paper.
1 I adapt the formulation for changes in national rice prices given in Warr (2008) to a model in which key parameters are allowed to vary across regions of the country. I assume that there are no strategic interactions among producers or consumers across villages, but local market power (among farmers) is possible in the sense of monopolistic competition.
The key prediction of the model is that changes in rice prices vary across villages according to a simple expression relating proportional changes in farmgate rice prices in village v in year t, p 
where η v ≤ 0 is the overall price elasticity of demand for rice (composite of domestic and imported) in the geo- 
The delayed effect of the import ban evident in that figure has a straightforward explanation. Imported rice was especially important in the months around harvests at the end of growing seasons with particularly low rainfall. Because the spring 2004 harvest occurred after a season of high rainfall, the lack of imported rice in early 2004 had little effect on prices. In fact, it was not until just prior to the primary harvest in spring 2005 after a season of low rainfall in certain regions that the lack of imports proved important as domestic rice prices began to escalate across Indonesia. 2 One concern with this approach is that Indonesia's import level directly affects world prices. Although there is some time series evidence that world prices are increasing in Indonesian imports, it is unclear whether the relationship is causal or due to the effect of climate shocks throughout Southeast Asia which reduce output in major rice-exporting countries and also increase demand for imports in Indonesia. By all accounts, Indonesia remains a price-taker in the world rice market. Dawe (2008) , for example, identifies an optimal ad valorem tariff of around 4 percent, which is essentially indistinguishable from free trade. 3 Small import shipments in late 2007 were undertaken as part of a limited government-licensed procurement from Thailand and Vietnam to be distributed largely through the Raskin program which provides heavily subsidized rice to households below and just above the poverty line.
while the counterfactual implies the opposite
The relevant empirical question, then, is what determines variation in m v across villages. According to equation (E.2), the local intensity of world price passthrough is governed by four parameters: the share of imports in local rice consumption, the price elasticities of supply and demand, and the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported rice. The key implications are that m v should be decreasing in the local price elasticity of supply and increasing in the share of imported rice in the markets which purchase village v output. 4 The limited available estimates suggest that supply elasticities vary considerably across regions and land types-0.15 on Java, 0.4 in Sumatra, 1.25 in Sulawesi for wetland paddy, and dryland supply elasticities are approximately twice as large (Warr, 2005) . Moreover, given prevailing transportation and trade costs, the local preban import penetration ratio should be decreasing in (i) the distance to the nearest international port and major wholesale markets, and (ii) the shipping distance from the nearest port to Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City, the two primary markets from which the majority of Indonesia's rice imports originate. Indonesia's unique geography generates substantial variation in these distance-driven components of m v . Using the monthly consumer rice price index described in the paper, Table E .1 demonstrates that the empirical changes in rice prices from 2002-8 are consistent with the model sketched above. I control for lagged rainfall levels to account for local supply shocks, and the main proxy for m v is the log average shipping distance to Thailand and Vietnam via the nearest port city in Indonesia. Regardless of the growth horizon on the left hand side (monthly, semi-annual, or annual), the primary takeaway is that after the import ban in January 2004, prices grew slower in Indonesian cities farther removed from the main rice exporter shipping routes in Southeast Asia. Before the ban, the opposite was true. Figure E .3 graphically depicts this main finding, which is consistent with equations (E.3) and (E.4). As elaborated in the paper, the distinct lack of spatial arbitrage evident in these results can be explained in part by the disruption of path-dependent, international buyer-seller networks after the import ban.
E.2 On Measuring Rice Prices
A few issues concerning the price indices deserve mention. First, while the price index is only available in 44 cities across Indonesia, these data points are arguably representative of the average regional prices faced by rice producers in nearby rural villages. Relative to prices in local rural markets, these measures should be (i) less affected by supply shocks in small groups of villages, and, (ii) more likely to capture the general equilibrium impact of the import ban.
Second, farmgate prices are not available at the regional level. Nevertheless, results would likely be unchanged if farmgate prices were used instead, given the high correlation between farmgate, wholesale, and consumer prices over the period under study (see Figure E .4). Third, in some regions of Indonesia, up to 15% the price index is actually comprised of cassava and other tubers. This does not pose a problem here since prices of cassava and other tubers were stagnant over the period under study and hence should have little effect on the overall index. 4 There are two other predictions less relevant to the first order discussion here. First, m v is decreasing in the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported rice. This elasticity should be quite homogenous across the country and relatively high (Warr (2008) estimates around 5) given that nearly all Indonesian rice production is of the Indica type which is the predominant variety produced in Southeast Asia and traded on world markets (Dawe, 2008) . Second, m v is increasing in the consumer price elasticity of demand for (all) rice in the regions relevant to village v. Estimates from the mid-1990s suggest that the price elasticity of demand is approximately -0.45 on average across all regions of Indonesia (Friedman and Levinsohn, 2001 ). Most of the variation in this estimate occurs within rather than across regions as the wealthy can more readily substitute away from rice staples when prices rise. The slight exception is that in some of the Outer Islands, availability of cassava and other tubers allow greater substitution away from rice and hence higher demand elasticities.
E.3 Spatial and Time Series Properties of Rainfall and Rice Prices
An important feature of rice prices is their approximate unit root properties. This is demonstrated in Figure E .5 which plots the p-values from augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests of the null hypothesis that the domestic rice price index in region c has a unit root (the different color dots correspond to alternative lag structures). Since rice prices across Indonesian cities are not independent, I also apply the heterogeneous panel unit root tests of Im et al. (2003) and Fisher's meta-analytic test, and in both cases, I fail to reject reject the null hypothesis that rice prices follow a unit root in all cities. Recognizing further the possibility that the structural breaks in prices around late 2005 evident in Figure 2 in the paper might be mistaken for unit roots, I apply city-specific Zivot and Andrews (2002) unit root tests which allow for an endogenous break in both trends and intercepts. Doing so, I fail to reject the null of a unit root in 41 out of 44 cities and identify structural breaks between 2004m11 and 2006m4 for all but five cities.
Whereas rice prices tend to follow a unit root, rainfall levels are serially uncorrelated across seasons. Considering seasonal rainfall levels at the district level (adjusted for province-specific growing seasons) going back to 1953, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of covariance stationarity for any Indonesian district. Figure E .6 documents the spatial variation in the measures of cumulative rainfall shocks used in the paper.
E.4 Exogeneity of Price Shocks with Respect to Landholdings Distribution
In Table E .2, I rule out the concern that rice price shocks were more intense in regions with a greater mass of large landholders selling to the market. Columns 1 and 2 reveal a small, statistically and economically insignificant effect shocks, which has little effect on the coefficient for λ v . Note that in column 6, we find that positive rainfall shocks exert downward pressure on prices as expected. This comes entirely from the post-ban period when imports play little role in stabilizing prices, which are now more tightly connected to domestic weather shocks.
E.5 Effect of Rainfall and Rice Price Shocks on GDP, Wages, and Profits
Rainfall has a strong positive relationship with time-varying agricultural productivity. Using a panel of districtlevel agricultural GDP from 2000-10, I estimate an elasticity of agricultural GDP with respect to rainfall (in periods t and t − 1) of around 0.15. This robust positive estimate is in line with results specific to rice output in Levine and Yang (2014) and Naylor et al. (2001) .
As discussed in Section 3.5 of the paper, Table E .3 shows that household expenditures (as a proxy for permanent income) exhibit an elasticity around 0.25 with respect to rainfall shocks and an elasticity around 1 with respect to rice price shocks when instrumenting using the policy variation in Table E.1. 5 Interestingly, the elasticity for price shocks is much smaller when not exploiting the persistent policy shock as an instrument. Table E.4 meanwhile shows that agricultural wages (although noisy) are increasing after positive rainfall and rice price shocks.
6
In Section 6, I note back of the envelope calculations for the increase in gross profits per harvest caused by the rice price shock. Here, I provide background on those calculations, which were based on village-specific profit margins. First, using data from Timmer (2008) in Rupiah terms after reindexing to the value of the index in Jakarta in each of those months. Third, I apply a measure of village-specific total paddy output (in kilograms) per hectare in 2001 (see Appendix C) to all potential farmers in the village. Although unit-level productivity varies varies across households, the bulk of this variation is across rather than within villages and hence little information is lost in focusing on productivity differences arising purely from land area planted (see Bazzi, 2012b) . Fourth, I convert wet paddy output to marketable rice output using a standard conversion factor of 0.55. Fifth, I convert Rupiah to USD at an exchange rate prevailing in late 2005 of 10,000 Rupiah to 1 USD. Finally, when accounting for own consumption, I assume that the household has two harvests per year and subtract 520 kilograms of rice (the recommended intake for a family of four) valued at the market price. Although I only reported the income boost for farmers with 0.25 and 0.75 Ha of landholdings, estimates for other landholding sizes are available upon request. Net Imports (millions kg) 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 Notes: This figure demonstrates that rice prices grew faster in port cities closer to Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City after the ban on rice imports. Monthly rice prices obtained from Wimanda (2009) . Distances calculated as the sum of (i) the travel distance from the village to the district capital reported in Podes 2005, (ii) the great circle distance from the given Indonesian city to the nearest port, and (iii) the average shipping distance from the given Indonesian port to the port in Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City. The port cities and shipping distances are obtained from http://e-ships.net. For cities with ports, I take the distance from the centroid of the city to the exact latitude/longitude of the port. Tables   Table E. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; Regressions estimated by weighted least squares with the dependent variable being log individual wages in Rupiah. The data span the years 2002-7 and the weights achieve representativeness at the district level. Wage reporting changed over the period and hence it is preferable to retain the individual-level observations rather than take a weighted average at the district level. Standard errors clustered at the district level.
Figures
This appendix presents several additional results beyond the main empirical analysis in the paper.
F.1 Heterogeneity in Land Quality
The main results in the paper are based on a measure of the landholdings distribution capturing rice growing in a planting season just prior to the ban on imports. In Table F .2, I show that the income elasticity of migration varies depending on the exposure of the given type of landholdings to rainfall and rice price variability. Column 1 reproduces the key estimates from column 4 in Table 5 of the paper. Column 2 shows that the heterogeneous effect of rainfall shocks (θ aλ ) is muted and statistically insignificant for λ v based on wetland holdings. Compared to columns 1 and 3, this specification focuses on households (and villages) with landholdings that are relatively less reliant on rainfall.
1 The second takeaway is that the heterogeneous effect of price shocks (θ pλ ) is considerably muted for λ v in column 3 based on landholdings used to grow crops besides rice. Compared to columns 1 and 2, this specification of λ v includes non-rice producing households (and villages) for whom rice price increases have a negative effect on real income. Overall, the patterns in Table F 
F.2 Controlling for Agricultural Wage Shocks
Adding agricultural wage shocks to the baseline estimating equation should dampen the elasticities with respect to rainfall and rice price shocks if some of the effects of those shocks are operating through changes in the returns to (rice) farming. Table F Table 5 in the paper. However, the key qualitative and quantitative results remain largely unchanged. baseline estimates of Θ in columns 1-3 to estimates when including (i) the log number of villages in v's district (columns 4-6), (ii) the log number of villages in v's district and the log area of v's district less v (columns 7-9), (iii) the log population of v (columns 10-12), (iv) the log population of v and area in v's district less v (columns 13-15), and (v) the log population of v and v's district less v (columns 16-18). Except for a few insignificant differences, I
F.3 Assessing Exclusion Restrictions
find no systematic departures from the baseline results in Table 5 . Table F .6 shows that the primary conclusions regarding the effects of rainfall shocks are robust to the inclusion of period-specific shocks rather than the difference in shocks between t and t − 1. Furthermore, I fail to reject that the coefficient on the rainfall shock in t equals the absolute value of the coefficient on the rainfall shock in t − 1. Table F .7 considers an alternative specification for rainfall shocks in which the annual shocks are fully elaborated from 2002-8 (i.e., the rainfall shock in each season s is assigned its own elasticity parameter θ as for 200s = 3, . . . , 8 and θ asλ for the interactions with λ v ). At the bottom of the table, I report the sum of coefficients for period t (s = 3, 4, 5), period t − 1 (s = 6, 7, 8), and both t and t − 1 (s = 3, . . . , 8) as well as the associated p-value for the null hypothesis that the given sum equals zero. In columns 1-3, we draw the same conclusions as in Table F .6: (i) the sum of period t (t − 1) rainfall shocks is positive (negative) and statistically significant, and
F.4 Alternative Specifications of Rainfall and Rice Price Shocks
(ii) the null hypothesis that θ a3 + θ a4 + θ a5 = −(θ a6 + θ a7 + θ a8 ) cannot be rejected. Furthermore, in columns 4-6, we similarly rule out the possibility that the baseline specification of rainfall shocks leads to spurious conclusions regarding the key elasticity parameter θ aλ . That is, the sum of period t (t − 1) coefficients on the interaction of rainfall shocks and λ v are positive (negative) and statistically significant. 3 In unreported results, I also show that the main results are robust to allowing negative rainfall shocks to have a different effect than positive rainfall shocks (i.e., rather than using a single continuous measure crossing zero). Table F .8 presents alternative approaches to measuring the rice price shock. Columns 1-4 report estimates of θ p and θ pλ using λ v for wetland holdings. In columns 5-8, I specify the price "shock" as a difference in log average prices over 2005m4-2008m3 and 2002m2-2005m3 rather than a difference in annualized log growth rates between those two periods. This specification yields similar results. In columns 9-12, I adopt insights from the model for rice prices developed in Appendix E.1. Because the model predicts that the price shock should be decreasing in distance from port cities in Indonesia and the shipping routes to Thailand and Vietnam, a negative coefficient on the two distance terms would be consistent with a positive elasticity of migration flows with respect to rice price shocks. Columns 9-10 are consistent with this hypothesized relationship as are the negative coefficients on the interaction terms with λ v in columns 11-12. These results are effectively the reduced form of the IV results in Table F .4.
F.5 Alternative Choices of the Pareto Lower Bound
Although the λ v parameters should be unaffected by the location of R, in practice, the Pareto distribution is only an approximation, which works better in some villages than others (see Appendix D). In Table F 4 Note that the sample sizes differ across columns because consistent (i.e., usable) estimates of λv require at least 3 distinct size measures above R * . Some villages do not satisfy this criteria for a given minimum threshold value and landholding type. 5 Although highly correlated with mean village income, mean household size also picks up variation in household labor supply, which may in turn affect the robustness of agricultural labor markets (i.e., off own-farm) and the capacity of households to diversify labor allocation across borders-both of which could have direct effects on flow migration rates. Tables F.11 and F.12 demonstrate that the key estimates of Θ ≡ (θ a , θ p , θ aλ , θ pλ ) in the paper are robust to and arguably strengthened by accounting for outliers in the data along a few important dimensions. Column 2 controls for the frequency with which the village updates its population register (see Appendix C). This helps account for some of the measurement error in migration rates as well as potential misclassification bias arising from villages reporting no migrants when in fact there is at least one migrant from the village. It is possible therefore that this count includes some undocumented migrants for which the determinants of migration choice and the nature of liquidity constraints may be somewhat different than for legal migrants. When dropping these provinces-which, keep in mind, still have a large number of legal international migrants-a few differences emerge with respect to the full sample results. First, in Table F .11, the elasticity parameters for rainfall and price shocks slightly increase. However, the estimates of θ aλ and θ pλ in column 7 fall in magnitude. The large, precisely estimated θ pλ for λ v based on wetland holdings disappears entirely. It seems, then, that undocumented migrants may explain some of the stronger response of migration flows to price shocks in villages with a greater mass of small landholders.
F.6 Accounting for Village Demographic Structure and Past Internal Migration
F.7 On the (Non-)Effect of Measurement and Reporting Outliers
F.8 Rainfall Shocks and Internal Migration
Here, I briefly discuss the effect of rainfall shocks on internal migration flows. Using weighted samples from where, for j = o, d, rainf all shock jt captures (in logarithmic form) the cumulative annual rainfall shocks over the four years prior to t, 8 υ j are geographic fixed effects, υ t is a year fixed effect, odt is an idiosyncratic error term.
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Estimating equation (F.1) by OLS for the entire period 1985-2010, I find α ≈ −0.056 (std. error of 0.022), which suggests that origin rainfall shocks reduce internal out-migration. Restricting to the period 2005-2010-roughly, the period over which I observe international migrants in the Village Potential data used in the paper-I obtain α ≈ −0.452 (std. error of 0.071). 10 (In both cases, I also find that β > 0 and statistically significant, which is consistent with migration being responsive to destination wage shocks.) Taken together, the negative estimates of α support the claim that positive rainfall shocks increase district population size and hence are likely also to increase village population size, presuming (i) inter-district migration is a lower bound for overall internal out-migration observed at the village level, and (ii) intra-district migration outside the home village follows similar processes.
Such upward pressure on village population size in the denominator of the dependent variable in the paper (∆log migrants/population) implies that the positive relationship between changes in international migration rates and rainfall cannot be explained by the unobservable internal migration flows at the village level.
F.9 Further Background on the Validation Exercise Using Micro Data
In the paper, I discuss results from estimating a migration choice model and using the implied marginal effects to recover an alternative measure of the village-level elasticity of flow migration rates with respect to income shocks.
In this brief subsection, I provide a few additional details on the analysis therein.
First, note that in columns 3-4 of Table 2 in the paper, I report coefficient estimates from the following equation migrate iv,t+1 = α + β rainf all shock vt + γ price shock vt + rainf all shock vt × (land i ζ
which, recall, I estimate using a conditional fixed effects (CFE) logit estimator, and where (i) land i comprises all landholdings owned, under rental, or rented out and used to grow rice, and (ii) column 3 imposes ζ a 2 = 0 and ζ p 2 = 0. Using these estimates, I then recover average marginal effects (AMEs) at each value of land i ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 2.5} Ha, where (i) 2.5 Ha is the maximum in the sample, and (ii) and the calculation of AMEs requires imposing η i = 0 ∀i. Thus, we obtain AMEs for both rainfall and rice price shocks at each landholding size (at 0.1 Ha increments). 1948-2010 excluding 2001-2004. 9 I use the log number of migrants rather than the migrant share or the odds of migration quite simply because the goal is to characterize changes in district population levels arising from internal migration (i.e., the denominator in the dependent variable in the paper). 10 I cluster standard errors by origin×destination district pair. Standard errors increase slightly when using two-way clustering (Cameron et al., 2011) on both origin and destination district. 11 Recall that the estimates are quantitatively similar when using the less-biased LPM approach to estimating AMEs with household fixed effects.
with respect to income shocks. I do so by applying the population shares to each landholding size-specific AME as implied by the village-level Pareto distribution. Consider, for example, the AMEs for rainfall shocks at landholding sizes 0.3 and 0.4 Ha. For each village v, I reweight the average of these two AMEs by the share of the population with landholding sizes∈ [0.3, 0.4] Ha as implied by the Pareto exponent λ v . 12 I repeat this over all increments of landholding sizes in the village, apply the AME at 2.5 Ha to all households above 2.5 Ha (as implied by λ v ), and then sum the reweighted AMEs to recover an aggregate village-level elasticity. In Table 8 , I then compared these implied elasticities to those from the actual village-level regressions in Table 5 , which allowed the effect of income shocks on flow migration rates to vary with λ v .
In recovering the elasticities of flow migration rates with respect to price and rainfall shocks, I take the baseline coefficient estimates of Θ ≡ (θ a , θ p , θ aλ , θ pλ ) in column 2 of Table F .2 for λ v based on wetland holdings. I then assign to village v the average marginal effects of the price shock for all villages with λ v in the same percentile.
That is, I calculate the average marginal effects of income shocks at each percentile of the distribution of λ v in the second-step sample of villages. Following this procedure makes it possible to compare the village-level elasticities with analogous elasticities recovered from an underlying migration choice model.
F.10 Further Background on the Estimation of Village-Specific Migration Costs
Having found strong empirical evidence of financial constraints to migration in testing the theory, I used the following structural equation (4) for the log flow migration rate to back out estimates of the migration costs:
Here, I provide a few additional details on the calculation of these village-specific migration costs not mentioned in the paper. Plugging in the relevant empirical data into the above equation, I then solve for the fixed migration costs C vjt . Obtaining an analytic solution, however, requires a few additional simplifications. First, I assume that migration costs are constant across periods. This assumption is conservative insomuch as migration costs likely 12 One could also imagine reweighting nonparametrically by applying the observed shares in the Agricultural Census. The approach based on λv is more consistent with the testable implications of the theoretical model and is moreover necessary for the purposes of comparison with the village-level elasticities of income shocks that vary with λv. fell in response to (i) competitive pressures in the recruitment industry and (ii) improvements in transportation infrastructure including the addition of new legal emigrant processing centers in a few provinces. Second, I
impose W vjt = W vj,t+1 = W vj , and I set W vj to be the average of the empirical wages across both periods.
F.11 What Role for Policy, Recruiters, and Networks?
Reductions in (upfront) costs can make it easier for poorer households and regions to access international labor markets even in the absence of large increases in own ability to finance. I use the estimated migration costs to provide two suggestive pieces of evidence on how intermediaries can reduce costs and dampen the income elasticity of migration.
Ethnic Networks. Several studies have shown how diaspora networks facilitate migration in low-income settings. In Indonesia, there are several ethnic groups that have longstanding religious ties to the Middle East or a migratory legacy across the Southeast Asia region. For example, the religiously conservative Sundanese have strong ties to Saudi Arabia (de Jonge and Kaptein, 2002) . Although their homeland lies in West Java, Sundanese can be found in villages across the Indonesian archipelago as a result of several decades of inter-island population resettlement beginning in the 1950s (see Bazzi et al., forthcoming) . The Buginese meanwhile hail from South Sulawesi but have a long seafaring history that led to a number of Buginese communities across Indonesia but also in Malaysia and Singapore (Lineton, 1975) . 
Recruiters.
The second way in which the poor are able to access costly migration opportunities is through recruiters, and in Indonesia these recruiters typically target female migrants. female and male migrants, suggests that migration costs are around 10 percent higher in villages with only male migrants compared to villages with only female migrants at baseline.
Although merely suggestive correlations, these results show that similar to other important migration channels today such as contemporary Mexico to the U.S. ( McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Munshi, 2003) and historical
Norway to the U.S. (Abramitzky et al., 2013) , migrant networks and intermediaries may play a crucial role in shaping the income elasticity of migration. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; Column 1 re-estimates the main heterogeneous effects estimate from column 4 in Table 5 in the paper on the slightly smaller sample of villages used in the latter columns, which introduce the non-land-based measure of wealth dispersion recovered from the Poverty Mapping exercise of predicting household expenditures per capita using household demographics, education levels, and assets from 2000 (Suryahadi et al., 2005) . The two measures of λ are directly comprable, and higher values indicate less dispersion. See the notes to Table 5 for additional details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and the significance levels are based on the block bootstrap-t procedure described in Appendix B. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; The table augments the baseline specification in columns 2-4 Table 5 in the paper with ∆ agricultural wage shock, which is the difference in log average district-level agricultural wages from Susenas household surveys over the same time horizon as the rainfall shocks. The sample is slightly smaller than the baseline due to missing observations in Susenas for a few districts in the early 2000s; however, this sample change does not affect the coefficients. ∆ rainfall shock is the difference in cumulative log deviations from long-run mean rainfall between the growing seasons ending in 2006-2008 and 2002-2005 . ∆ rice price shock is the difference in annualized log growth rates between 2005m4-2008m3 and 2002m1-2005m3 . The estimate of λv is based on paddy area planted; higher values indicate less dispersion in landholding sizes. All columns are based on the Das et al. (2003) procedure and include a 3rd degree polynomial in the propensity scores for the extensive margin in 2005 and 2008 . Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and the significance levels are based on the block bootstrap-t procedure described in Appendix B. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ log (emigrants/total population) between 2005 and 2008 and has mean 0.11. Column 1 reproduces the estimate from column 2 of Table F .2. Instruments in column 2 include (i) shipping distance from the nearest port to the average of Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City and its interaction with λ, and (ii) distance to the nearest international port and its interaction with λ. All estimates are based on the Das et al. (2003) semiparametric correction procedure. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and the significance levels are based on the block bootstrap-t procedure described in Appendix B. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; The table reports estimates of the key elasticity parameters sequentially relaxing one or two of the four baseline exclusion restrictions. The estimates in columns 1-3 correspond to baseline results for λv obtained for wetland holdings. All estimates are based on the Das et al. (2003) semiparametric correction procedure and the measure of λv for wetland holdings. The results are similar for parametric Poirier (1980) correction procedure and others types of landholdings. The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ ln (M v,t+1 /N v,t+1 ) and has mean 0.11. Additional covariates in all specifications but not reported here include all those in Table 5 . The correction terms are jointly statistically significant in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap-t procedure. Sample sizes are identical across sub-columns within the super-column, as reported at the bottom of the table. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; The top panel is the baseline approach and takes the difference in cumulative log rainfall deviations between periods t (2006-8) and t − 1 (2003-5). The bottom panel allows cumulative log rainfall deviations in periods t and t − 1 to enter separately. The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ ln Mv,t+1/Nv,t+1 and has mean 0.11. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap−t procedure. Additional covariates in all specifications but not reported here include all those reported under Table 5 in the paper. (13) (in columns 1-3) and (14) (in columns 4-6) in the text with a fully elaborated set of annual rainfall shocks instead of cumulating those shocks over three seasons into a single rainfall shock term. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap−t procedure. The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ ln M v,t+1 /N v,t+1 and has mean 0.11. Additional covariates in all specifications but not reported here include all those reported under Table 5 in the paper. The p-values in the bottom panel are based on F tests. Notes: Columns 1-4 are the baseline. Columns 5-8 uses the log difference in average rice prices between periods as the measure of the "shock". Columns 9-12 apply the insights from the trade model in Appendix E.1 to use a distance-based proxy for the local intensity of the price shock. The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ ln M v,t+1 /N v,t+1 and has mean 0.11. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap−t procedure. Additional covariates in all specifications but not reported here include all those reported under Table 5 in the paper. Notes: The table reports estimates allowing for alternative R thresholds in the estimation of λv (and the share of households above R). Baseline estimates using R = 0.1 Ha are reported in columns 1-6 of the top panel. All estimates in the table are for wetland holdings. The dependent variable in all specifications is ∆ ln Mv,t+1/Nv,t+1 and has mean 0.11. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap−t procedure. Additional covariates in all specifications but not reported here include all those reported under Table 5 in the paper. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; Standard errors are clustered at the district level in all specifications, and significance levels are based on a block bootstrap−t procedure. Column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates from 
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G.1 Ruling out a Balls-and-Bins Interpretation of the Extensive Margin
I adapt a simple probabilistic balls-and-bins test developed in Armenter and Koren (2014) to show that the extensive margin cannot be explained as a purely random phenomenon arising from the existing distribution of village sizes. The basic idea is to compare the empirical incidence of zeros with that arising from a model in which villages receive migrants (balls) randomly but with the probability proportional to village population size. Suppose that each migrant m is a ball. There are M ∈ N total migrants comprised of the sum across all villages, M = V v=1 m v . Also, suppose that each village is a bin, the width of which is given by the share of that village's population in the total population of Indonesia. Formally, the size of bin v is given by s v = N v /N , where N v is village v population and N = V v=1 N v . The joint probability of migrants across villages follows a multinomial distribution
in which the expected number of nonzero migration villages V * (or non-empty bins) is given by
Calculating the sample analogue of equation ( Figure G .1 compares the predicted probability of having any migrants under the balls-and-bins model (dashed curve) with the actual share of villages with any migrants (solid curve). Both are plotted against log village population size. The incidence of zeros in the data is much higher than would be predicted on the basis of a random balls-and-bins allocation of migrants across villages. The vertical distance between the two curves constitutes the scope for the theory and empirics in the paper to address the substantive economic forces behind the extensive margin including, among others, the role of recruiters.
G.2 A Heuristic Framework for Recruiter Location Choice
If the market of potential migrants is too small, recruiters will not serve v, and upfront cost will be accordingly high. Given the difficulty of initial (first-mover) migration from villages without outside intermediaries, recruiter location choice should be highly correlated with the extensive margin. To add structure, one can think of recruiters as "traveling salesmen" tasked with identifying the least cost method of visiting a set number of locations within a defined area. Consistent with evidence in Bachtiar (2011) , suppose that these agencies must obtain operating licenses in district capitals and face a fixed cost of entering villages (e.g., making royalty payments to village officials). In order to maximize potential migrants reached and minimize fixed entry and variable travel costs, recruiters must first select districts within which to operate and then the order in which villages are visited.
To illustrate the logic behind these implications, first consider two districts k and k with equal populations and inter-village travel distances. District k has two equally populated villages, while district k has three villages:
village 1 k has equal population with the two villages in k, while villages 2 k and 3 k are equally populated with the total equal to the population of 1 k . Assuming (i) constant fixed costs of establishing agency presence in equally sized districts and (ii) constant fixed costs of entering villages, a given recruiter would be more likely to enter district k than k . If, however, recruiters choose to visit district k for other (unobserved) reasons, then village 1 k would be more likely visited than 2 k or 3 k . Now, add one identical village to each district with population greater than all existing villages in each district. Assuming recruitment agencies are subject to budget constraints preventing visits to all villages within k, it is straightforward to show within this framework that recruiters would only visit the newly added village in k. 2 Now suppose that the fixed cost of entering a village, f , is identical across all villages and that the ex ante probability of successfully recruiting any individual potentials migrant is identical across villages. The optimization problem for the recruitment agency is to maximize the number of potential migrants, M v , reached (with advertisements and contract offers) and to minimize the costs (and hence maximize expected revenue). The objective is then
where B is the exogenously given budget of the recruitment agency. The (heuristic) solution function (i.e., the optimal district) should be increasing in N k −v and decreasing in A k −v and V k . Once inside a given district k, all else equal, budget-constrained recruiters are relatively more likely to visit villages with larger populations since the unconditional probability of successfully recruiting a single migrant is higher.
In Table G correlation with the area of v's district is not. However, that the probability is decreasing in the distance from the subdistrict capital (albeit not the district capital) suggests that some of the distance components of the model hold. A more rigorous test would require computing the actual distances between villages and using some of the available methods for solving the traveling salesman problem. This is beyond the scope of the present study as the patterns observed in Table G .1 bear out indications that recruiter decisions follow some approximation to the model described above. Other important results in Table G Notes: The "actual data" estimate is based on a local linear probability regression of an indicator for any migrants in village v on log population, using an Epanechnikov kernel and trimming the top 1 percent of villages for presentational purposes. The "balls-and-bins" prediction is based on the model described in Section G.1. Notes: Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%; The table reports marginal effects at the mean from a probit regression of all covariates shown in the respective columns as well as the following additional covariates in column 2: wetland area as a share of total farmland, log distance to nearest emigration center, and an indicator for government-prescribed urban status. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
H Panel Data Construction
In this subsection, I describe the process of constructing a panel dataset of Indonesian villages comprised of data collected in 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2008 . Starting from the baseline 65,966 villages in Table 1 in the paper, the final sample of villages is reduced further by two factors. First, because this paper focuses on heterogeneous income shocks in agricultural areas, I exclude urban villages without land-holdings entries in the Agricultural
Census. There are other practical reasons for doing so as well. In Indonesia, agricultural commodity price increases generally have homogeneous, negative effects on real income in urban areas, and rainfall shocks tend to have no effect on rice production in nominally urban areas ( Levine and Yang, 2014) . Second, changes in administrative boundaries over the period 2000-2008 required dropping a small number of villages with missing data from one or more of the additional sources, including the Population Census of 2000. I ultimately treat these villages as missing at random. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, responding to a range of political and economic incentives in the wake of decentralization, government officials set about proliferating administrative units across the country and at varying levels of government (see Fitrani et al., 2005) . The proliferation was relatively more common in the Outer Islands than on Java. This process has created difficulties for researchers attempting to link administrative units over time in the Podes and other surveys. Most researchers work with district-level aggregates and take districts in some base year and aggregate backwards to achieve minimum comparative areas (MCA) (e.g., Vothknecht and Sumarto, 2009) . For studies such as the present one, however, it is crucial to retain the village as the unit of analysis.
The remainder of this appendix details the matching of villages across multiple waves of Podes (2002, 2005 and 2008) these villages as missing at random insomuch as the timing of elections resulting in the splitting of districts and subsequently villages has been shown elsewhere to be orthogonal to baseline observables of interest (Skoufias et al., 2010) .
At the next stage of matching, I incorporate data from the 2000 Population Census using the unique administrative IDs available in Podes 2005. The merge-matching algorithm proceeds analogously to that described above. 
